We consider the customers' strategic behavior in Markovian queues with negative customers and working breakdowns. when a negative customer arrives, the customer being served is forced to leave the system. At the same time, the server breaks down and the service rate decreases. Arriving customers decide whether to enter the system or balk based on a natural reward-cost structure and the information of the system. By using the probability generating functions, we analyze the steady-state distribution and obtain the mean sojourn time of the arriving customers. We investigate the customers' behavior under different information levels of the system and derive equilibrium strategy for the customers in the fully observable, almost observable, almost unobservable and fully unobservable cases. Finally, some numerical results are provided to illustrate the effect of the system parameters on equilibrium strategies of the observable case and customers' sojourn time for unobservable cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decades, there has been an emerging tendency in the literature to study queueing systems which are concerned with customers decentralized behavior and socially optimal control of arrivals. Such an economic analysis of queueing systems is based on a simple linear reward-cost structure which incorporates their desire for service and their dislike for waiting. The fundamental results about various models can be found in the comprehensive monograph written by Hassin and Haviv [1] with extensive bibliographical references.
Nowadays, there is a growing interest in the economic analysis of strategic behavior of customers in variants of queues. Burnetas and Economou [2] first studied a Markovian single-server queueing system with setup times and derived equilibrium strategies for the customers under various levels of information. Economou and Kanta [3] considered the Markovian queue with breakdowns and repairs. They derived equilibrium threshold strategies in fully observable
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Chi-Tsun Cheng . and almost observable queues. Thereafter, more and more researchers begin to focus on this research. One recently very active direction is the consideration of queues with different kinds of classic vacations(see e.g., Guo and Hassin [4] , Sun et al. [5] , Economou et al. [6] , Liu et al. [7] ). Similar economic studies have been also implemented in the queueing systems with various working vacations (see e.g., Zhang et al. [8] , Sun and Li [9] , Sun et al. [10] , Sun et al. [11] ). Another direction in the economic analysis of queueing systems concerns the study for the M/M/1 queue with an unreliable server (see e.g., Wang and zhang [12] , Li et al. [13] , Yu et al. [14] , Chen and Zhou [15] ).
In the queueing models with an unreliable server described above, we all assume that present customers wait for the server to be repaired without being served after the server breaks down. Different from these queues, Kalidass and Kasturi [16] introduced a new concept of working breakdown, which means that the service may not be interrupted and the service continues at a slower rate when the server breaks down. This concept in real life is really meaningful. For example, when a virus appears on the computer, the processing speed of the computer will be slower. Another example is the machine replacement problem at the factory. In general, the factory will prepare substitute machines. When a machine fails, it is replaced with a substitute machine so that the system does not completely stop running. It should be noted that working breakdown is different from working vacations. Working vacation occurs when the system is empty, while working breakdown can happen at any time. Moreover, in real life, there are many reasons for the failure of the server, including the arrival of a negative customer or disaster. There are some papers about negative customers, disasters and working breakdowns. Based on the model in Kalidass and Kasturi [16] , Liu and Song [17] considered the batch arrival queue with breakdowns. Kim and Lee [18] investigated an M/G/1 queue with disasters and working breakdowns in which the system consists of a main server and a substitute server. When the main server fails, the substitute sever provides the service to the arriving customers at a lower service rate. Jiang and Liu [19] analyzed a GI/M/1 queue in a multi-phase service environment with disasters and working breakdowns. According to the economic analysis of these type queues, Lee [20] studied customers' equilibrium and the server's optimal pricing strategies in unobservable queueing systems with negative customers and repair under two different pricing models: the EPP scheme and the EAP scheme. Boudali and Economou [21] , [22] discussed equilibrium balking strategies in an unreliable single-server queue with catastrophes, where the server fails and all present customers in the system are forced to leave upon the catastrophe's arrival. Li et al. [23] and Yu et al. [24] considered equilibrium analysis of a single-server Markovian queueing system with working breakdowns. Yu et al. [25] studied the equilibrium strategies in Markovian queue with muti-phase failure and repairs.
Inspired by the aforementioned studies, we analyze the equilibrium behavior of customers in an observable and unobservable M/M/1 queueing system with negative customers and working breakdowns. When the negative customer arrives the system, the customer in service will be killed. At the same time, the main server is repaired and a substitute server in preparation starts to work at a lower service rate. The combination of negative customers and working breakdown is based on real-world problems. For example, a negative signal in a neural network cancels out a positive signal and suppresses the transmission of information. Another example is that a virus in a computer system can disrupt the work being processed and slow down the operation of the computer system. This paper aims to discuss four cases with regard to the level of information available to customers upon arrival. The first case is fully observable case where the customers can observe the queue length as well as the server state upon arrival. And the almost observable case is the second case where the customers can only observe the number of customers, while in the almost unobservable case the customers can only observe the state of the server. Lastly, in the fully unobservable case the customers know neither the queue length nor the server state before deciding whether to enter or balk. We discuss customers' optimal strategies for all customers and analyze the stationary behavior of the corresponding system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Descriptions of the model are given in Section 2. In Section 3 and Section 4, we consider the equilibrium threshold strategies in the fully observable and almost observable queues, respectively. In Section 5 and Section 6, we determine the equilibrium strategies in the almost unobservable and fully unobservable queues, respectively. In section 7, some numerical results are presented to illustrated the effects on equilibrium balking strategies and customers' behavior. Conclusions are given in Section 8.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
This paper considers M/M/1 queueing systems with negative customers and working breakdowns. Potential customers arrive according to a Poisson process with a rate λ. The system consists of a main server and a substitute server. In a regular busy period, service times are supposed to be exponentially distributed with a rate µ 1 . When there is no customer in the system, the server is idle. As soon as a negative customer arrives at the system, the main server fails and is sent to repair immediately. During a repair period, new arrival continues to join the system. At the same time, the substitute server provides services to customers. The service rate of the substitute server is lower than that of the main server and the service rate is µ 0 (µ 0 < µ 1 ). Negative customers arrive according to a Poisson process with a rate ξ . And negative customers kill the customer in service. When they occur, the server will break down and the repair time is exponentially distributed with a rate η. We assume that negative customers occur when the server is in the normal busy period, and the inter-arrival time, the service time and the repair time are mutually independent. In addition, the service discipline is first in first out (FIFO).
Arriving customers are assumed to be identical and they decide whether to join or balk upon arrival by maximizing self-interest. We assume that a customer's utility consists of a reward for receiving service minus a waiting cost. Specifically, every customer receives a reward of R units for completing service and endures a waiting cost of C units per time unit when he remains in the system. Finally, we assume that there are no retrials of balking customers nor reneging of waiting customers.
Denote by N (t) the number of customers in the system at time t and let J (t) = 0 be the state that the server is in working breakdowns period at time t and J (t) = 1 be the state that the server is in regular service period at time t. This is a continuous time Markov process with the state space = {(n, i) : n ≥ 0, i = 0, 1}. VOLUME 7, 2019 In the following sections, we will analyse the queues with negative customers and working breakdowns, and consider four information cases in this paper: (1) the fully observable case where arriving customers can observe the system state (N (t), J (t)); (2) the almost observable case where arriving customers can only observe the length of the system N (t);
(3) the almost unobservable case where arriving customers can only observe the server's state J (t); (4) the fully unobservable case where customers can not observe the system state.
III. FULLY OBSERVABLE CASE
In this section, arriving customers can observe both the number of customers in the system and the server's state at arrival. There exist threshold strategies (n(0), (n(1)) such that an arriving customer decides to join the system if the number of customers upon arrival does not exceed the specified thresholds.
Let W (n, i) be the expected sojourn time of the arriving customer who finds the system at the system state (n, i) (i = 0, 1) and decides to enter the queue. Then, his expected net benefit is U ni = R − CW (n, i).
Theorem 1: In the fully observable queue with negative customers and working breakdowns, there exist equilibrium thresholds (n e (0), (n e (1)) = ( x 0 , x 1 ),
where x i is the unique root of the equation
where
.
Proof: Let S 0 be the service time during working vacation period, S 1 be the service time during regular busy period, T be the inter-arrival time of negative customers and M R be the residual repair time.
To compute W (n, 0), we need to consider two cases for state (n, 0). The first case is that the service time S 0 is less than the residual repair time M R . In this case, upon completion of the current service, the server will continue to be repaired and remain low service state. The second case is S 0 is greater than the residual repair time M R . After the repair time, the server will switch to the regular busy period. In this case, the customer's sojourn time should include the elapsed service time at rate µ 0 (ie, the remaining repair time), but before the service is completed, the server will change to the regular busy period and then provide the service with rate µ 1 . We generally ignore the previous service time (see references [8] , [9] , [23] and [25] ).
Using the conditional argument, we have the Laplace-Stieltjes transform of W (n, 0) as follows:
Similarly, for n = 0,
Then, using W (n, 0) = −W * n0 (0), we can get
Using the same analysis, we know that if a tagged customer arrives during a regular busy period at state (n, 1), the server either continues to provide the service with a high service rate or goes into a working breakdown period. Thus, we have
Then, doing some algebraic manipulations, we can directly obtain
Solving the equations (3) and (5), we have
By substituting (6) into (4), we can obtain
and combining (6), we derive
Through iterating (11) and taking account into (9), we get
Substituting (13) into (6), we get
By using (8) and (12), we derive the expressions of W (n, 1) and W (n, 0), then
In addition,
Therefore, the sequence U ni (i = 0, 1) is monotonically decreasing with respect to n. Consider a tagged customer at his arrival instant and assume that all other customers follow the same threshold strategy. If the expected benefit U ni > 0 he strictly prefers to enter, he prefers to balk if U ni < 0 and is indifferent between entering and balking if U ni = 0. We can use the above analysis results of U ni to obtain that the arriving customers at state (n, i) prefers to join the system if n ≤ n e (i). After rearranging, we get the results of the theorem 1.
What's more, from (12), we get the results W (n, 0) − W (n, 1) > 0 and U n0 < U n1 . Then, we find that n e (0) < n e (1) which means that customers are more willing to enter the system during the regular busy periods.
Remark: If S 0 > M R and we do not ignore the previous service time (or the residual repair time), using the same method, we can get the following results:
The result of W (n, 1) can also be proved. Compared with the case in theorem, these results are only variations on some of the coefficients.
IV. ALMOST OBSERVABLE CASE
In this section, we focus on the almost observable case, where a customer can only observe the number of customers present and cannot know the state of the server at their arrival instant. We seek equilibrium threshold for the customers. Thus, the customers follow the same threshold strategy n e .
Taking n e (0) = n e (1) = n e , we get stationary distribution of the corresponding Markov chain with the state space ao =
{P ni : (n, i) ∈ ao } is the stationary distribution of the process{(N (t), J (t)), t ≥ 0}. We have the following results.
Theorem 2: In the almost observable case where all customers adopt the same threshold n e , the stationary distribution {P ni : (n, i) ∈ ao } is given as follows:
and c i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) are determined by using normalization condition and ρ i are the roots of the characteristic equation.
Proof: In steady-state, we have the following system equations:
(η + µ 0 )P n e +1,0 = λP n e 0 ,
(λ + ξ )P 01 = ηP 00 + µ 1 P 11 ,
(µ 1 + ξ )P n e +1,1 = λP n e 1 + ηP n e +1,0 .
Solving (23) with respect to P n1 and substituting in (26) we obtain
This is a four-order difference equation. We obtain P n0 = 4 i=1 c i ρ n i (n = 1, 2, · · · , n e ), where ρ i are the roots of the characteristic equation and c i are to be determined.
From (24) and (27), we have P n e +1,0 = λ η + µ 0 4 i=1 c i ρ n e i and
From (21) and (25), we get
putting n = 1 in (23), and from the above equations, we get
The value of c i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) can be determined by using normalization condition, (28) and (29). Our first concern is the expected net benefit of an arriving customer if there are n customers in system. We have the following result:
Lemma 1: In the almost observable queues where customers use same threshold n e , the net benefit of an arriving customer that observes n customers in the system and decides to enter is given by where ω = η η+µ 0 and W (n, i)(i = 0, 1) are given by (15) and (16) .
Proof: The net benefit of an arriving customer that observes n customers and decides to enter is given by U (n) = R − CW (n), where W n = E[S|N − = n] means his mean sojourn time when he finds n customers in the system before he arrives. Let π I |N (i|n) (i = 0, 1) be the probability that an arriving customer finds the server at state i and there are n customers. Conditioning on the state of the server that he finds upon arrival, we obtain W (n) = W (n, 0)π I |N (0|n) + W (n, 1)π I |N (1|n) = W (n, 1) + (W (n, 0) − W (n, 1))π I |N (0|n) (32) and π I |N (i|n) = λπ n0 λπ n0 + λπ n1 , n = 0, 1, · · · , n e + 1.
Using the stationary probabilities, we obtain the probabilities π I |N (i|n) for n = 0, 1, · · · , n e + 1. So, we obtain W (n) (n = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n e +1). It's worth noting that customer does not enter the empty system if U (0) < 0. Otherwise, he enters the queue.
Let
Clearly, f 1 (n) = U (n), n = 0, 1, · · · , n e , f 2 (n e + 1) = U (n e + 1). Moreover, f 1 (n) ≥ f 2 (n), n ≥ 0. We have that if U (0) > 0 and lim n→∞ f 1 (n) = −∞ then f 1 (0) > 0. So, we can find a finite number n u in the sequence (f 1 (n)) that satisfies inequality
Obviously, f 1 (n) > f 2 (n) (n = 0, 1, · · · ), so f 2 (n u + 1) < f 1 (n u + 1) ≤ 0. In the range from 0 to n u + 1, we can find that a number n l satisfies the inequality f 2 (n l ) > 0, f 2 (n l + 1), f 2 (n l + 2), · · · , f 2 (n u + 1) ≤ 0 (36)
where n l is the first positive term of the sequence (f 2 (n)). If the sequence (f 2 (n)) is non-positive between 0 and n u + 1, then we have
Next, we consider equilibrium threshold strategies and have the following theorem.
Theorem 3:
In the almost observable queues with negative customers and working breakdowns, n e = n l , n l + 1, · · · , n u are equilibrium strategies.
Proof: We consider a tagged customer at his arrival instant. It can be known from (30), (33) and (35) that the customer prefers to enter when he finds n (n ≤ n e ) customers in the system.
If an arriving customer finds that the number of customers in the system is n e + 1, the customer prefers to balk. It can be known from expected net benefit f 2 (n e + 1) ≤ 0 because of (31), (34), (36) or (37). Therefore we conclude that there are equilibrium strategies n e = n l , n l + 1, · · · , n u .
The social welfare per time unit when all customers follow the threshold strategy n e given in Theorem 3 equals: S ao (n e ) = λR(1 − P n e +1,0 − P n e +1,1 )−C n e +1 n=0 n(P n0 + P n1 ).
(38)
V. ALMOST UNOBSERVABLE CASE
In this section, we turn to the almost unobservable case, where a customer can only observe the state of the server at their arrival instant and cannot know the number of customers present. The customer's strategy in this case can be described by a joining probability q i (0 ≤ q i ≤ 1), which is the proportion of joining customers at the server's state i (i = 0, 1) and the effective arrival rate is λq i .
Let P ni = lim t→∞ P{N (t) = n, J (t) = i}, then {P ni : (n, i) ∈ } is the stationary distribution of the process{(N (t), J (t)), t ≥ 0}. We introduce the partial generating functions G i (z) = ∞ n=0 z n P ni i = 0, 1; |z| ≤ 1. And the probability of the server's state is given by π i = G i (1) = ∞ n=0 P ni , i = 0, 1.
In steady-state, we have the following system equations:
(λq 1 +µ 1 +ξ )P n1 = λq 1 P n−1,1 +µ 1 P n+1,1 +ηP n0 , n ≥ 1.
(42)
Adding these equations from n = 0, we obtain λq 0 P n0 + λq 1 P n1 = µ 0 P n+1,0 + (µ 1 + ξ )P n+1,1 , n ≥ 0.
By summing for all n, µ 0 P 00 + (µ 1 + ξ )P 01 = (µ 0 − λq 0 )π 0 +(µ 1 − λq 1 + ξ )π 1 .
(44) VOLUME 7, 2019 Let m 0 (z) = (λq 0 z − µ 0 )(1 − z) + ηz and m 1 (z) = (λq 1 z − µ 1 )(1 − z) + ξ z. Multiplying (39)-(42) by z n and summing over n, we get m 0 (z)G 0 (z) − ξ G 1 (z) = (µ 0 P 00 + ξ P 01 )(z − 1), (45)
Solving the equations (45) and (46), we obtain
From (43), we have the following equation
In addition, using the normalization condition G 0 (1) + G 1 (1) = π 0 + π 1 = 1, we get
Lemma 2: The function ϕ(z) has a unique root r in (0, 1).
Proof: Clearly, m 1 (0) = −µ 1 < 0 and m 1 (1) = ξ > 0, then m 1 (z) has two roots z 1 < 1 and z 2 > 1. In addition, because G 0 (1) = π 0 = (µ 0 P 00 +ξ P 01 )ξ +ξ µ 1 P 01 ϕ(1) > 0, so we have ϕ(1) = ξ (µ 0 − λq 0 ) + η(µ 1 − λq 1 ) + ξ η > 0. According to ϕ(z), we have ϕ(0) = −µ 0 µ 1 < 0, and ϕ(z 2 ) = ξ ηz 2 1−z 2 < 0. So three roots of the function ϕ(z) lie in (0, 1), (1, z 2 ) and (z 2 , +∞). When q 0 = q 1 = 0, the root r 0 = µ 0 µ 1 µ 0 µ 1 +ξ µ 0 +ηµ 1 +ξ η . When z = r, the numerator of G 1 (z) must equal zero. Then, from (44) we obtain
From (46) and (50), we get
Therefore, the conditional queue length, denoted by L i (q 0 , q 1 ), is L i (q 0 , q 1 ) = G 1 (1)
and (54), we obtain
Then, combining (15) and (16), the conditional expected sojourn time is
W (L 0 (q 0 , q 1 ), 0)
and the expected benefit of such a customer who decides to enter the system is
Lemma 3:
If µ 0 > λq 0 and µ 1 > λq 1 , S 0 (q 0 , q 1 ) is strictly decreasing for q 0 and S 1 (q 0 , q 1 ) is strictly decreasing for q 1 .
Proof: According to the previous expression, we know that m 0 (r) is monotonically increasing for q 0 . From (34), the numerator is increasing with respect to q 0 and the denominator is decreasing with respect to q 0 , so L 0 (q 0 , q 1 ) is increasing for q 0 . Since W (n, 0) is monotonically increasing, S 0 (q 0 , q 1 ) is monotonically decreasing for q 0 . Similarly, S 1 (q 0 , q 1 ) is monotonically decreasing for q 1 .
Lemma 4: If µ 0 > λq 0 and µ 1 > λq 1 , S 0 (q 0 , q 1 ) < S 1 (q 0 , q 1 ).
Proof: From (53) and (54),
Due to P 10 > 0, L 0 (q 0 , q 1 ) > L 1 (q 0 , q 1 ). And because W (n, i) is monotonously increasing with respect to n and W (n, 0) > W (n, 1), so we have W (L 0 (q 0 , q 1 ), 0) > W (L 1 (q 0 , q 1 ), 1) and S 0 (q 0 , q 1 ) < S 1 (q 0 , q 1 ). Theorem 4: In the almost unobservable queue with negative customers and working breakdowns, there exists a unique equilibrium strategy (q e 0 , q e 1 ), where the vector (q e 0 , q e 1 ) is given by
, where x * 1 is the unique root of the equation S 1 (0, q 1 ) = 0.
Case 3: If W (L 1 (0, 1), 1) < R C < W (L 0 (0, 1), 0), (q e 0 , q e 1 ) = (0, 1). Case 4: If W (L 0 (0, 1), 0) < R C < W (L 0 (1, 1), 0), (q e 0 , q e 1 ) = (x * 2 , 1), where x * 2 is the unique root of the equation S 0 (q 0 , 1) = 0.
Case 5: If R C > W (L 0 (1, 1), 0), (q e 0 , q e 1 ) = (1, 1). Proof: According to Lemma 3, we have q e 0 ≤ q e 1 . For a tagged customer, he prefers to enter the system only when S i (q 0 , q 1 ) > 0. He will balk if S i (q 0 , q 1 ) < 0. Let's discuss each scenario in detail. Case 1. When q 0 = q 1 = 0, we get W (L 1 (0, 0), 1) = µ 0 +ξ +η µ 0 µ 1 +µ 0 ξ +µ 1 η . If R C < µ 0 +ξ +η µ 0 µ 1 +µ 0 ξ +µ 1 η , we find that S 0 (0, 0) < S 1 (0, 0) < 0. From Lemma 3, S 0 (q 0 , q 1 ) ≤ S 0 (0, q 1 ) < S 1 (0, q 1 ) ≤ S 1 (0, 0) < 0. Then the tagged customer prefers to balk and q e 0 = q e 0 = 0. Case 2. When µ 0 +ξ +η µ 0 µ 1 +µ 0 ξ +µ 1 η ≤ R C < W (L 1 (0, 1), 1), which indicates that S 1 (0, 0) ≥ 0 and S 1 (0, 1) ≤ 0. We obtain that the equation S 1 (0, q 1 ) = 0 has a unique root x * 1 ∈ [0, 1]. In this case, equilibrium strategy in the normal busy period is q e 1 = x * 1 . In addition, S 0 (q 0 , q e 1 ) < S 0 (0, q e 1 ) = 0, the equilibrium strategy of the tagged customer is balking if the system is under repair. Case 3. When W (L 1 (0, 1), 1) < R C < W (L 0 (0, 1), 0), which leads to S 0 (0, 1) < 0 < S 1 (0, 1). From Lemma 2, we have S 1 (0, , q 1 ) ≥ S 1 (0, 1) > 0. In this case, when the server is in normal busy period, the best response of the customer is entering. Hence, q e 1 = 1. From the relation S 0 (q 0 , 1) < S 0 (0, 1) < 0, We also get q e 0 = 0. Case 4. When W (L 0 (0, 1), 0) ≤ R C ≤ W (L 0 (1, 1), 0), which indicates that S 0 (1, 1) ≤ 0 and S 0 (0, 1) ≥ 0. In this case, we obtain that the equation S 0 (q 0 , 1) = 0 has a unique root x * 2 ∈ [0, 1] and q e 0 = x * 2 . In addition, S 1 (q e 0 , q 1 ) ≥ S 1 (q e 0 , 1) = 0. Then, if the server is at state 1, equilibrium strategy of the tagged customer is entering.
Case 5. When R C > W (L 0 (1, 1), 0), we have S 1,1 > S 0 (1, 1) > 0. That is S 1 (q 0 , q 1 ) ≥ S 1 (q 0 , 1) > S 0 (q 0 , 1) ≥ S 0 (1, 1) > 0. Therefore, q e 0 = q e 0 = 1.
We now turn our attention to social benefit. From (47) and (48), we have the probability generating function G(z) as follows.
where δ(q 0 ,
After some algebraic simplifications, the expected queue length if an arriving customer decides to join the system is
The social benefit per time unit can now be easily computed as
VI. FULLY UNOBSERVABLE CASE
In this section, arriving customers can observe neither the state of the server at their arrival instant nor the number of customers present. A strategy can be described by a fraction q (0 ≤ q ≤ 1), which is the probability of joining, and the effective arrival rate is λq.
To identify the equilibrium strategies of the customers, we should first investigate the stationary distribution of the system when all customers follow a given strategy q, which can be obtained by Theorem 2 by taking q 0 = q 1 = q. So the expected queue length if an arriving customer decides to join the system is
where δ(q) = ξ (µ 0 −λq)+η(µ 1 −λq+ξ ). And using Little's law, we can obtain the expected sojourn time in the following.
Lemma 5: In the M/M/1 queue with negative customers and working breakdowns, and µ 0 > λ, W (q) is strictly increasing for q ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: We let
). VOLUME 7, 2019 Then, we obtain
Since µ 1 > µ 0 > λ, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and 0 < r < 1, we can have ληr 2 (µ 1 −µ 0 +ξ )(ξ +η)δ(q) > 0. What's more, the sojourn time of the customers W 1 (q) is non-negative and the numerator (ξ + η) 2 (µ 0 − λqr) + η(µ 1 − µ 0 + ξ )(ξ r + m 0 (r)) ≥ 0, so we get g(q) > 0. Thus, we conclude that W (q) is strictly increasing with respect to q ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 5: In the M/M/1 queue with negative customers and working breakdowns, if λ < µ 0 , there exists a unique equilibrium strategy q e , where q e is given by
where q * e is the unique root of the equation R − CW (q) = 0, and
,
where r 1 is the root of ϕ(z) when q = 1 and r 1 ∈ (0, 1). Proof: We consider a tagged customer. If he decides to enter the system, his expected net benefit is U (q) = R − CW (q). From Lemma 2, we conclude that U (q) is strictly decreasing for q ∈ [0, 1].
If R C < W (0), U (q) is negative for every q ∈ [0, 1], thus the best response of the tagged customer is balking.
If W (0) ≤ R C ≤ W (1), there exists a unique q * e satisfying R−CW (q * e ) = 0 for which customers are indifferent between entering and balking.
If R C > W (1), for every strategy of the other customers, the tagged customer has a positive expected net benefit if he decides to enter. Hence, q e = 1.
What's more, the social benefit per time unit can now be easily computed as
Let q * be socially optimal strategy. When we assume that R = 1, C = 1, λ = 0.5, µ 1 = 1.5, µ 0 = 1, ξ = 0.1 and η = 0.2, we get socially optimal strategy q * = 0.4173, while the equilibrium strategy is q e = 0.7354. We observe that q * < q e , which shows that the individual optimization deviates from the social optimization. 
VII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we present some numerical results to expose the effects of the system parameters on equilibrium strategies and the behavior of the customers.
We first consider the fully and almost observable cases and investigate the sensitivity of equilibrium thresholds with respect to the system parameters. The results are shown in Fig. 1-5 . In Fig. 1 , when the service reward R varies, the thresholds increase. This agree with the intuition. The more reward for service, the higher the customer's utility. Fig. 2 shows that the equilibrium thresholds decreases as the failure rate ξ increases. This is because the failure is too frequent, so the server always switches from the normal busy period to the working breakdown state, and the service rate becomes lower, so that the waiting time of the customer increases. Then, the willingness of customers to enter is reduced. In Fig. 3 , we investigate that the equilibrium thresholds are increasing functions for the repair rate η, which means that customers prefer to enter the queue when the server are in regular busy period. In Fig. 4 and 5, we observe that equilibrium thresholds are all increasing with respect to µ 1 and µ 0 . It is intuitive that customers prefer to join the system when the service rate is higher. We know that an increase in the service rate will make the customer's sojourn time shorter, which makes the customer more willing to enter the queue.
Moreover, we observe that in Fig. 1-5 , the range of {n l , n l + 1, · · · , n u } is contained within the range between n e (0) and n e (1) . In other words, the thresholds in the almost observable model is between two separate thresholds of the fully observable queue that the customers can observe the state of the server.
On the other hand, we consider the variation trend of customers' sojourn time in the almost unobservable and fully unobservable queues. In Fig. 6 , we observe that when q 1 is fixed and q 1 = 0.6, W (L 0 (q 0 , q 1 ), 0) is increasing with respect to q 0 ; when q 0 is fixed and q 0 = 0.4, W (L 1 (q 0 , q 1 ), 1) is increasing with respect to q 1 . We also find that W (L 0 (q 0 , q 1 ), 0) > W (L 1 (q 0 , q 1 ), 1). These results confirm exactly what we proved earlier. Fig. 7 shows that W (q) increases monotonically with the increasing of q. This indicates that the increase of the joining customers' number leads to the increase of their sojourn time.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyzed the customer strategic behavior in the M/M/1 queueing system with negative customers and working breakdowns. Four different cases with respect to the levels of information provided to arriving customers have been investigated extensively and the equilibrium strategies for each case were derived. We discussed the sensitivity of the equilibrium threshold about different system parameters in fully observable queue and investigated customers' sojourn time in almost and fully unobservable queues. Furthermore, the direct generalization is to concern the optimal price of social planner due to the increased operating costs caused by switching service rates.
